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This essay is a reply to Dr Steffek’s ambitious work, ‘The Cost of Capital – the
Normative Foundation of Corporate Law?’ Dr Steffek’s paper identifies that
reducing, or minimising, the cost of capital occurs as normative in the Capital
Markets Union (‘CMU’) project, but that it appears alongside many other
normative concerns. The paper makes a contribution to the CMU literature by
promoting minimising the cost of capital to ‘the’ normative concern of CMU.
It also makes a contribution to wider corporate law theory by extending its
claim beyond CMU.
Methodologically the paper supports its claim by a series of careful steps.
Three of these are particularly important for the plausibility of the thesis. First,
the concept of ‘cost of capital’ is broadly drawn, including costs of production,
costs of finance and governance costs. Each of these costs is, in its turn, broadly
drawn so that, for example, the costs of mistakes of managers are included as
costs of governance and the costs of finance include all ‘associated’ costs of
finance such as return on default. Secondly, the paper carefully reconstructs the
corporate law rules with which it is primarily concerned, and assesses them
against the objective of minimising cost of capital (in its broad sense). Finally,
the paper does not dispute that other normative concerns exist, such as protec-
* Assistant Professor of Law, London School of Economics and Political Science, London,
United Kingdom.
Brought to you by | London School of Economics and Political Science
Authenticated
Download Date | 9/7/17 10:01 AM
tion of consumers, employee protection etc. but it attributes these normative
concerns to other areas of the law such as consumer protection law or labour
law, or affords them a subsidiary role.
The paper is rich, detailed and careful and it is tempting to enter into a meta-
analysis of its detailed claims. But instead I have chosen to focus on the central
claim of the paper, that ‘the’ normative concern of the CMU project in
particular, and of corporate law more generally, is to minimise the cost of
capital. I should say at the outset that I have assumed the purpose of identify-
ing a dominant normative concern is to inform policy choices. This essay then
proceeds in four stages. First, it considers the case for what a Western ethicist
might call a ‘transcendental’ normative concern of corporate law.1 Secondly, it
considers the analytical force of Dr Steffek’s conception of ‘cost of capital’ and
the challenge with incorporating a number of important externalities within it
which would be need to be taken into account in order to determine whether
the costs of capital have, in fact, been minimised. Thirdly, it touches briefly on
the vexed question of the relationship between law and the cost of finance.
Finally, it considers the extent to which minimising the cost of capital should
be a dominant normative concern after the financial crisis. The essay then
concludes.
ATranscendental Normative Concern for Corporate Law
The first way in which Dr Steffek’s paper makes a contribution is by identify-
ing what I have termed (adopting the language of those in the Western ethical
tradition such as Amartya Sen) a ‘transcendental’ normative concern for all
corporate law. Sen uses this term in his lively critique of the work of John
Rawls’ on political justice, and in his famous conundrum of three children and
a flute. He sees the problem of striving for a ‘unique impartial resolution’ to
the question of a perfectly just society in the following terms, ‘... the possible
sustainability of plural and competing reasons for justice, all of which have
claims to impartiality and which nevertheless differ from – and rival – each
other.’2 Benjamin Friedman makes a similar point in different terms, ‘There is
no contradiction in the fact that most citizens care about many different
aspects of their society, including different questions of public policy, and that
any one individual’s preferences on different issues are often in tension with
one another.’3 Deirdre McCloskey is similarly critical of attempts in ethics to
1 See, for example, A. Sen The Idea of Justice (London: Penguin Books 2010).
2 Ibid., at p. 12.
3 B. Friedman, The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth (New York; Vintage 2005)
at p. 100.
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find the ‘ultimate norm’,4 and makes a similar point about the reality of
conflicting interests (drawing on Jane Addams), ‘The collision of interests,
each of which has a real moral basis and a right to its own place in life.’5 A
similar question mark arises as to whether it is possible to promote the
normative concern of minimising the cost of capital over all other normative
concerns for corporate law, or whether we can, for example, readily agree on
different normative concerns for corporate law, some of which we would like
to see fulfilled at the same time, some of which we would like to apply in
different weights in different circumstances, and all of which may appear to
conflict with each other.
Dr Steffek is not the first person to undertake the exercise of seeking to
uncover a single, or at least dominant, normative concern for corporate law. In
Easterbrook and Fischel’s pioneering work, the normative concern of corpo-
rate law is that it ‘should contain the terms people would have negotiated, were
the costs of negotiating at arm’s length for every contingency sufficiently low.’6
Although Easterbrook and Fischel do not expressly extend their analysis to
corporate restructuring and insolvency law, others have sought to do so. Most
famously, Thomas Jackson conceived of the stakeholders in the company
negotiating behind a veil of ignorance (borrowing from Rawls again). In this
state a creditor would not know how she would fare in the race to enforce
against the assets of an insolvent company. As a result, she would prefer a
system in which creditors were prevented from enforcing against the assets of
the company, and the proceeds were shared rateably amongst them. Thus
corporate restructuring and insolvency law should reflect this hypothetical
bargain, so that modern insolvency law should offer a moratorium against
enforcement and should respect rateable division of the assets.7 This provides a
coherent ‘contractarian’ normative theory for all of corporate law, including
corporate restructuring and insolvency law (notwithstanding that part of it
rests on a hypothetical bargain).
Yet often this ‘economic’ analysis of the law seems to us curiously detached
from the reality of the situations with which we are concerned. McCloskey
tells us how the distinguished US judge Richard Posner (and the father of the
law and economics movement) stretches the thesis to slavery and rape but
4 D.N. McCloskey, The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce (Chicago and
London: The University of Chicago Press 2006), at p. 264.
5 From J.B. Elshtain ‘Addams, Jane’ in Fox and Kloppenberg (eds) A Companion to
American Thought cited inMcCloskey, n 4 above, at p. 285.
6 F.H. Easterbrook and D.R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press 1996) at p. 15.
7 T.H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (Cambridge, Massachusetts and
London England: Harvard University Press 1986).
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admits, ‘That any sort of rape license is even thinkable within the framework
of the wealth-maximization theory that guides so much of the analysis of this
book will strike many readers as a limitation on the usefulness of that theory.’8
But one does not need to go so far as slavery or rape to run into trouble. Much
more straightforward, real world scenarios present themselves where other
normative concerns for corporate law are implicated besides reduction of
transaction costs. For example, suppose we take the example of a small supplier
who is routinely paid late by a larger, powerful customer, so that she struggles
to pay for her own supplies. Of course, she can simply take her business
elsewhere, or launch proceedings in the courts, but we all know that the
realities of the ‘free’ market do not match up to this theory. So the normative
theory sounds clever (brilliant even) in abstraction but we are suspicious if we
have lived and done business in the real world. We cannot neatly box up all of
these concerns and parcel them out to other branches of the law – consumer
law, perhaps, or employment law. We must face the fact that the longer we live
with markets the more we understand their imperfections, and reducing trans-
action costs is a concern, but it can scarcely be said to be the concern, for
corporate law.
In a recent working paper, Jackson and Skeel describe the primary concern of
corporate insolvency law ‘to help reduce the frictions that otherwise would
impede assets from moving to their highest and best use.’9 It is not the purpose
of their paper to extend the analysis beyond corporate insolvency law, but
adopting Dr Steffek’s framework one can see that they might have done so.
Essentially, the reallocation of capital, from a firm which cannot make use of it
to a firm which can, minimises the cost of capital for sustainable businesses in
the economy. Indeed, in a famous article, Douglas Baird frames the point in
this way,10 and goes on to focus on the ex ante effects of corporate bankruptcy
law on the costs of capital for healthy firms.11 But crucially Jackson and Skeel
acknowledge, ‘even those who think this [reducing the frictions that otherwise
would impede assets from moving to their highest and best use] is too narrow
a description of the purposes of bankruptcy law would almost certainly agree
that it is a, if not the, primary purpose’. And their normative concern is itself
framed in a different way from Easterbrook and Fischel’s theory (as extended
8 R. Posner, The Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little Brown 4th ed 1992), p. 218
cited inMcCloskey, n. 4 above, at p. 404.
9 See TH Jackson and DA Skeel Jr, ‘Bankruptcy and Economic Recovery’ University of
Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law and Economics Research Paper No 3–27,
29–34 (available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2306138).
10 D. Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (1988) 108(3) Yale Law Journal 573 at
p. 580
11 Ibid., at p. 589.
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by contractarian bankruptcy theorists). Let us suppose that you disagree with
me in my analysis, or that you prefer Easterbrook and Fischel’s framing to that
of Jackson and Skeel. Given that right-thinking, consenting adults can validly
disagree on the ranking of different normative concerns, is the search for a
single, primary normative concern for all of corporate law a search we should
undertake?
To this somewhat sententious question, we might also ask whether, even if a
transcendental normative concern can be found, it will remain constant over
time and geography. In a recent paper I challenged the ongoing relevance of
Chapter 11’s normative concern for distributional fairness in large corporate
debt restructurings.12 I did not dispute the appropriateness of elevating
distributional fairness above Chapter 11’s other normative concerns when it
was first developed in the 1970s (although others have sought to do so, and
there is an extensive, associated literature),13 and I agreed that it continued to
be a dominant concern in corporate insolvency and small and medium sized
enterprise restructuring. Rather, I sought to show how changes in the finance
market have solved some of the distributional problems which informed the
original policy choices in some scenarios. In the introduction to their won-
derful work on the neoliberal project, Bondi and Laurie analyse the problem
of developing what they call ‘neoliberal best practice’, so that policies are
transferred, ‘from one context to others, wrestling the specific socio-political
contexts and relationships through which they had been forged, and impos-
ing them elsewhere with minimal regard for distinctive features of policy-
making and policy-receiving environments.’14 This is consistent with an
evolutionary theory of law, where ‘law is regarded as a social subsystem
12 S. Paterson, ‘Rethinking Corporate Bankruptcy Theory in the Twenty-first Century’
(2015) 36(4) Oxford J Legal Studies 697.
13 See, for example, LM LoPucki ‘The Debtor in Full Control – Systems Failure under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?’ (1983) 57 American Bankruptcy Law Journal
247, 249; M Bradley and M Rosenzweig, ‘The Untenable Case for Chapter 11’ (1992)
101 The Yale Law Journal 1043; L Bebchuk and H Chang, ‘Bargaining and the Division
of Value in Corporate Reorganization’ (1992) 8 Journal of Law, Economics and Organi-
zation 179; B Adler, ‘Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bank-
ruptcy’ (1993) 45 Stanford Law Review 311; LM LoPucki, ‘The Trouble with Chap-
ter 11’ (1993) Wisconsin Law Review 729; DA Skeel Jr, ‘Rethinking the Line Between
Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy’ (1994) Texas Law Review 471, 535;
A Schwartz, ‘A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy’ (1998) 107 The
Yale Law Journal 1807; DA Skeel Jr, ‘Creditors’ Ball: The New New Corporate
Governance in Chapter 11’ (2003-2004) 152 University of Pensylvania Law Review
917, 920–21.
14 L. Bondi and N. Laurie, ‘Introduction’ in N. Laurie and L. Bondi (eds) Working the
Spaces of Neoliberalism (Massachusetts, Oxford and Victoria: Blackwell Publishing
2005), at p. 2.
320 Sarah Paterson ECFR 2/2017
Brought to you by | London School of Economics and Political Science
Authenticated
Download Date | 9/7/17 10:01 AM
evolving together with, but distinct from, other aspects of society such as the
economy’.15 Thus the normative concerns of one era may not be those of a
subsequent era, nor may those concerns necessarily be constant between
jurisdictions. Normative concerns are local in time and space.
Arguably this does not matter. We must simply continually revisit the norma-
tive concerns which have informed policy decisions as we adapt corporate law.
The problem with this is that law’s development is path dependent: as Cronk
and Leech put it in the context of organic evolution ‘what it is like now is a
function of what it was like in the past, and what it is like now constrains what
it can become in the future.’16 In my own work I have suggested that US
scholars have found it hard to reconsider the debate between the economic
objectives of Chapter 11 and the concern for distributional fairness in the
context of the very different finance market of the twenty-first century, but
that a reimagining is required. Saul Bellow puts it this way ‘Like everyone who
invests in doctrines at a young age, I couldn’t give them up.’17 Thus I argue that
we should be cautious about raising one normative concern above the others at
one point in time.
One reason why the search for the absolute ideal continues to attract us, I
suggest, is that it seems more systematic, more orderly, than the alternative. As
Dr Steffek points out, this is all the more the case when we consider the work
of scholars who have railed against the projects of Easterbrook and Fischel or
Jackson or Baird to provide us with a ‘pocket sized card’18 to tell us what we
should expect of corporate law (generally) or corporate insolvency law (speci-
fically). Thus, as Dr Steffek hints, Elizabeth Warren appears to throw in the
towel with her ‘dirty, complex, elastic, inter-connected .....’ view of corporate
insolvency law.19 Elizabeth Warren denies us the hope of a coherent formula
which we can apply to the dilemma of the corporate law project, but does not
seem to offer us anything concrete in its place. Yet just as McCloskey has
argued in the field of ethics, the absence of a single, normative concern which
dominates all others does not need to leave us with ‘merely a fungible list of
good things you might want to get hold of,’20 and we can still strive for ‘a
15 R.C. Nolan, ‘Property in a Fund’ (2004) 120(Jan) L.Q.R. 108–136.
16 L. Cronk and B.L. Leech, Meeting at Grand Central: Understanding the Social and
Evolutionary Roots of Cooperation (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press,
2013), at p. 24.
17 S. Bellow, It All Adds Up: From the Dim Past to an Uncertain Future (New York:
Penguin 1994), at p. 308 cited inMcCloskey (n 4 above), at p. 59.
18 Borrowed fromMcCloskey (n 4 above), at p. 322.
19 E. Warren, ‘Bankrupety Policy’ (1987) 54 U. Chic. L. Rev. 775, at p. 811.
20 McCloskey (n 4 above), at p. 316.
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useful middle ground – a golden mean, you might say.’21 It is possible to
systemise our normative concerns, and we certainly should not avoid organis-
ing for fear that it will necessarily lead to ordering (with all of the attendant
dangers of privileging one normative concern over another). We can accept
that we have a number of values for corporate law which cannot be combined
and which may perhaps be accorded different weights in different situations.
Dilemmas will emerge, but the system is all the more useful for acknowledging
the dilemmas and the need to make choices. Vanessa Finch has had a go at such
a system, identifying (somewhat after the virtue ethicists) four values to act as
guiding principles in evaluating corporate insolvency law.22 I have begun to
make my own contribution, by taking one normative concern for ‘fairness’
(both substantive and procedural) and applying it to the reality of three
different types of corporate debt restructuring. The project aims to illustrate
the necessity of considering the normative concern and the reality of the
situation together (the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ as essential bedfellows) and to show
that the normative concern cannot be applied unthinkingly from one situation
to another. So we might, for example, divide our normative concerns into how
we treat the individual participants in the system (both procedural and distri-
butional fairness between equally situated stakeholders, and between one
group of stakeholders and another), how we influence the economy as a whole
(the availability and cost of capital for healthy companies and the ability to
facilitate the (re)allocation of scarce resource to highest and best use) and the
implications for society at large (whether the system creates negative external-
ities) and apply them carefully in designing CMU. It is not the purpose of this
paper to expand on that scheme, but it is suggested merely to show that
rejecting a unifying normative concern does not necessarily lead us to chaos.
Defining ‘costs of capital’
Dr Steffek’s construction of ‘costs of capital’ begins uncontroversially enough.
On the one side, he places the costs of production and, on the other, the cost of
finance for those costs of production. The classic objection to this formulation
is that by focusing only on the costs of capital, a number of unfair effects are
ignored which, even if they are not considered from a moral or ethical stand-
point, obscure the overall economic result. So, for example, if corporate insol-
vency law focuses only onmaking sure that companies in the economy have the
right capital structure, we might be concerned that it will ignore other conse-
21 McCloskey (n 4 above), at p. 337.
22 V Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Principles and Perspectives (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press 2nd ed 2009).
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quences such as the loss of jobs which ought properly to be taken into account
in determining the final economic result.23 For the moment, I have deliberately
framed this as an economic issue (adding in the cost of lost jobs) rather than as a
moral or ethical one (fairness to weaker creditors or stakeholders in the insol-
vency bargain). But even framed as an economic question, it is not clear how it
can be quantified and includedwithin the firm specificmodel.
First, there is the purely practical question of quantification. The politically
motivated rescue of the US car industry provides a useful illustration. Scholars
have plausibly argued that a central concern of corporate insolvency law is to
separate viable from unviable businesses. Accordingly, they are critical of the
rescue of Chrysler which was, by all accounts, struggling in the competition to
produce cars which consumers wanted to buy.24 These scholars argue that if
Chrysler had been allowed to fail other, better manufacturers would have
captured its share of the market and would have thrived, a process which
Joseph Schumpeter called “creative destruction.” This is, of course, how a
market economy is supposed to work. If demand for Chrysler’s products falls,
then Chrysler’s income should fall relative to the incomes of owners of ‘better’
producers in the sector. If Chrysler is allowed to fail, this will motivate those
employed by Chrysler to move to jobs with more efficient producers. In the
context of Dr Steffek’s thesis, the failure of Chrysler would have minimised the
costs of capital for other, better manufacturers and over the long run this would
produce more jobs rather than fewer and would make a greater contribution to
economic growth. Thus it is that in the command economy of East Germany
before 1988, ‘the design of the Trabant, the boxy, pollution-belching East Ger-
man sedan hadn’t changed in thirty years,’25 whilst in the market economy of
the West state-of-the-art-of-production Mercedes rolled off the line. There
may be a political motivation to compensate those who lose their jobs with
Chrysler for moving to new employment, but that is not for corporate law.
The difficulty with this argument is whether it stands up to scrutiny in the real
world. First, there is the question of the scale of the loss which may require
compensation. This includes not only direct economic costs, such as state
welfare benefits paid to unemployed workers whilst they seek new jobs, but
also indirect costs such as mental health care costs caused by long-term
unemployment, the costs of severely fractured families as a result of the strain
of the situation etc. These costs may be too large to be compensated at a time
23 LM Lopucki and WC Whitford, ‘Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorgani-
zation of Large, Publicly Held Companies’ (1993) 14 U Pa L Rev 669.
24 Jackson and Skeel n 9 above, at p. 33.
25 A. Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World (London and New
York: Penguin 2007), at p. 132.
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of scarce resources and it may simply be more cost-effective to bail out the
firm. As Alan Blinder puts it, ‘Short spells of unemployment may not be
terribly problematic; some are even welcome as people move or change jobs.
But long spells of joblessness are devastating.’26 So a straightforward cost-
benefit analysis may militate against failure.
Secondly, whilst in theory the failure of Chrysler should enable other firms to
make better use of its resources leading to new jobs, the real-world effects in
competitive markets may be quite different and it may be that the loss of jobs
at Chrysler is not replaced by an equal number of permanent jobs elsewhere,
or at least not in the United States. In a world of competitive, global markets,
there is a chance that non-American car brands would have picked up the
market share. This is a particular issue at a time when globalization and
technology, cumulatively, are reducing the number of skilled, industrial jobs,
and the US endures growing income inequality and risks to social cohesion.
Once again, proponents of the economic view argue that the answer to this
dilemma is better and more targeted education and training dedicated to the
new economy. Yet once again this is unlikely to provide immediate relief for
the newly-redundant Chrysler workforce. Those who shrug at the inevitable
hardship visited on the losers by the process are rarely losers themselves.
Moreover, even if the sector does rebalance itself over time, and more efficient
US producers pick up the slack, we have no way of knowing how long that
will take and, therefore, how long the ‘short run’ will be (or, to reflect a more
famous saying, the long run could take a very long time). In order for the
residents of the geographically affected area (and much of wider society) to
accept the devastating effects of the closure or serious downscaling of a
principal employer, they must believe that things are going to get better. Yet
the reality of a collapse may not be able to secure transitions to other employ-
ers fast enough to convince those affected that this will be the case. In the
meantime, the slowness and difficulty of delivering improvements may simply
be interpreted as the comfortable imposing devastation on the deprived in their
own, selfish interests.
At the same time, Dr Steffek’s model is understandably a firm specific one. But
factors such as the ‘ripple effect’ as other businesses fail, or wholesale disloca-
tion in a particular state as unemployed individuals come to terms with their
situation, ultimately require us to model the economy as a whole. As Green-
span has admitted, the financial crisis revealed that, ‘macromodeling unequi-
vocally failed when it was need most.’27 The challenges with macroeconomic
modelling lead to the risk that we retreat behind straightforward assumptions
26 A.S. Blinder After the Music Stopped: the Financial Crisis, the Response and the Work
Ahead (New York: the Penguin Press 2013), at p. 12.
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and ignore difficult ones. All that can be built are broad, conceptual models
with abstract mathematical beauty waiting to be ‘slayed’ (as Thomas Huxley
put it), by ‘ugly fact’.28 This concern has been at the heart of a great deal of
post-crisis criticism of neo-classical economic thinking on a more general
level.29 It is one of the reasons why modern risk management forecasting failed
to predict the scale of so-called ‘fat tail’ events such as the financial crisis: the
effects of rare but significant events on the scale of probabilities. On a more
parochial level the financial crisis provides a neat illustration of this risk.
Famously, financial institutions modeled their ‘value at risk’ or VAR. Those
who designed these models were probably well-aware of their limitations,
particularly that they were not intended as a model for running the business.
But somewhere along the line many in positions of authority appear to have
lost sight of the seriously limiting assumptions which bounded the usefulness
of ‘VAR’ and to have come to see it instead as a prescription to live by. The
crisis revealed to us all the dangers of relying on simplistic models. Overall,
then, although the costs and benefits can be framed as economic issues rather
than, say, communitarian concerns,30 and would seem capable of being in-
cluded in Dr Steffek’s model, they are in reality somewhat imponderable in
many complex situations, and it is not at all clear how we can practically
quantify them. Put shortly there is a risk that we ‘sacrifice realism to mathe-
matics,’31 or to put it another way that we arrive at ‘grossly fallacious, if
superficially plausible, assessments.’32
Not only is Dr Steffek’s model a firm specific one, but it also does not really
engage with the question of capital flows across borders. CMU focuses not
only on reducing the cost of capital but also on increasing the availability of
capital by encouraging the free flow of capital amongMember States, and from
investors based outside the European Union. However, a significant challenge
here is the natural home bias of the investor. This was obvious even to Adam
Smith, who (in the only place inWealth of Nations where the phrase ‘invisible
hand’ actually appears) counselled against protectionist measures on the basis
that the investor’s home bias rendered them unnecessary:
27 A. Greenspan, The Map and the Territory: Risk, Human Nature, and the Future of
Forecasting (New York: The Penguin Press, 2013) at p. 7.
28 Thomas Huxley, ‘Biogenesis and Abiogenesis’ (presidential address at the British Asso-
ciation 1870) cited in Greenspan TheMap and the Territory ibid., at p. 151.
29 Ibid., at p. 188–190.
30 For an excellent overview of communitarian theory see M. Sandel, Justice: What’s the
Right Thing to Do? (Penguin Books 2010), at pp. 220–221.
31 R. Skidelsky,Keynes: The Return of the Master (London: Penguin, 2009), at p. 82.
32 D.M. Winch, Analytical Welfare Economics (Middlesex, England: Penguin 1971), at
p. 156.
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He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor know how much he is
promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his
own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest
value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible
hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.33
In theCMUproject, divergent laws are seen as contributing to this challenge, as
they encourage investors’ home bias by raising the costs of due diligence and the
risks of legal uncertainty. In a relatively recent article, Franken broadly divides
states into dominant states (which export capital) and dependent states (which
import it).34 In Franken’s thesis, a dependent state has an incentive to transplant
laws from the dominant state not so much because the normative concerns of
corporate law identify that those laws are superior to the current laws of the
dependent state, but rather simply because they are already understood by the
financiers from the dominant state, so that those financiers will not be required
to due diligence and understand a new regime before investing. Against this
backdrop, many aspects of the CMU project appear increasingly influenced by
the laws of the United States, given the depth of the finance market in that
jurisdiction and the promise of inward investment. This leads to new questions
about the reality of universalising corporate law, given the complex interactions
between different aspects of corporate law, between corporate law andother law
such as labour law and consumer law, between corporate law and the local social
and political context and between corporate law and the overall institutional
environment, all of which fall outside the scope of this essay. For our purposes
the crucial point is that CMU is not only concerned with reducing the cost of
capital but also with the availability of capital, and that implicates different
concerns for the process of lawmaking and law reform.
Things become even more complicated if we engage seriously with the political
motivation for the rescue of Chrysler. It is easy to discount this as political
expediency: if Chrysler fails then the mid-West will suffer and voters will
defect from the party in power. Framed in this way, the policy is driven by an
overtly political, short term view, with no conceptualizing of the best option to
be preferred in the long-run. But in casting the objective in this way, we are
making one sort of value judgement. If we reframe the issue such that in
twenty-first century US society it is no longer seen as acceptable for one part
of the country to suffer short-term, terrible losses in order to increase the
33 A. Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations R.H.
Campbell and A.S. Skinner (Oxford: The Glasgow Edition of theWorks of Adam Smith
1976) at IV ii 4, p. 456 cited in J.Z. Muller, The Mind and the Market: Captialism in
Western Thought (New York: Anchor Books) at pp. 65–66.
34 S. Franken, ‘Cross-border Insolvency Law: A Comparative Institutional Analysis’
(2014) 34 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 97.
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welfare of US society at large over the long run, and the government is
responding to this value judgment in US society, then we have an entirely
different view of the objective of the policy. It is a twenty-first century
equivalent of Victorian society’s outcry against utilitarianism as a guiding
principle in urban industrialization,35 and the demand to temper the ‘blind
operation of the market economy.’36 It can readily be accepted that by rescuing
Chrysler some of the efficiency of the competitive markets in which Chrysler
operates are undermined. But it is perfectly possible to make a particular
distributional value judgment, which determines that it is more important to
protect the workers of Chrysler and the communities in which it is embedded
from the consequences of failure than to ensure that the competitive equili-
brium is not jeopardized, without a wholesale rejection of the principles of free
markets. Indeed, it may be part of the process by which a general commitment
to free market values is legitimated. It is the function of the political process to
make these sorts of value judgments,37 and to decide how different imperatives
interact, although once the value judgment has been made, other disciplines
such as corporate law can assist in determining how it can best be fulfilled.
A further note on this can be added, once again, from the financial crisis. In his
excellent work on the financial crisis, Alan Blinder has highlighted what he
calls ‘the strangest legacy’ of the period: ‘The stunning combination of policy
success and political failure.’38 By this he means that the extraordinary interven-
tion by the authorities does broadly seem to have worked (it does seem that
things could have been much worse) but that the electorate is not prepared to
accept it. Professor Blinder attributes this to two things. The first is a total
failure to understand that if the bailout terms were seen to be too generous
they would simply outrage the public, so that the bailouts involved shares with
low dividend rates, no outright ban of dividend payments to shareholders, no
explicit requirements to maintain or increase lending volumes, no commitment
to address housing foreclosures and only minimal restrictions on executive
compensation.39 Secondly, there was a complete failure to explain clearly to the
public what had happened and why the authorities were acting in the way that
they were. The result has been a public awakened ‘in a foul mood.’40 Professor
35 See, for example, D. Winch, ‘Mr Gradgrind and Jerusalem’ in S. Collini, R. Whatmore
and B. Young (eds) Economy, Polity and Society: British Intellectual History 1750–1950
(Cambridge andNew York: CUP 2000).
36 P. Thompson, TheMaking of the English Working Class (Narmondsworth 1968) pp. 64,
376 cited inWinch ibid., at p. 252.
37 See, for example, D,M, Winch, Analytical Welfare Economics (Middlesex, England:
Penguin Books 1971), at pp. 25–30.
38 Blinder (n 26), at p. 438.
39 Ibid. This list is taken from p. 202.
40 Ibid., at p. 291.
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Blinder then shows how this has given rise to a serious backlash, leaving ‘many
observers wondering whether the U.S. government would be able to mount
such an extensive and complex rescue should the music stop again.’41 This is
relevant to our account because it shows that politics matter. In the end, in a
democracy, political leaders must carry the electorate with them, or the wider
consequences for public policy will be more damaging than the short run
concessions.
The ‘inter alia’
Dr Steffek’s paper also includes a small, but crucial, qualification: that the cost
of capital is, inter alia, determined by the costs of company law and corporate
insolvency law. Here the devil is in the ‘inter alia’ detail. Notwithstanding an
extensive literature, the precise influence of company law and corporate in-
solvency law on the cost of capital remains highly contentious. For example,
scholars have justified the insolvency priority of secured credit on the grounds
that it increases the availability and reduces the price of financing – in other
words, that it reduces the cost of finance in Dr Steffek’s model.42 But in his path
finding work Alan Schwarz has challenged this analysis, arguing that either
lower pricing for secured credit should be compensated by higher pricing
elsewhere, or that it involves a transfer of risk from secured (powerful) cred-
itors to unsecured (weaker) ones.43 In the empirical finance literature, the
relationship between interest rates and the presence of collateral is somewhat
murky. At first sight, the intuition would be that the presence of security
should make the loan safer, and thus reduce the cost of capital. However,
Rodano et al, drawing on Berger and Udall, note that banks may require
collateral from borrowers they consider riskier, so that in practice collateral
can be associated with both higher and lower rates.44 Choi and Triantis propose
an even more complex relationship between price and collateral, in some ways
reversing the relationship, in seeking to explain the relatively well documented
observation that amounts of collateral pledged increase when interest rates are
higher. They argue that an increase in the interest rate attracts a riskier pool of
41 Ibid., at p. 344.
42 T. Jackson and A. Kronman, ‘Secured Financing and Priorities Affecting Creditors’
(1979) 88 Yale L.J. 1143.
43 A. Schwarz, ‘Security Interests and Bankruptcy Policies: A Review of Current Theories’
(1981) 10 J. Legal Stud. 1
44 G. Rodano, N. Serrano-Velarde and E. Taratino, ‘The Causal Effect of Bankruptcy Law
on the Cost of Finance’ available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1967485, at pp. 9–10,
citing A.N. Berger, G.F. Udell, ‘Collateral, Loan Quality and Bank Risk’ 25(1) Journal
of Monetary Economics 21–42.
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borrowers, and that lenders may respond to this by flexing what they call the
nonprice terms of the loan such as strengthening the collateral in order to
differentiate less risky borrowers from risker ones (because riskier borrowers
are less willing to pledge assets as collateral).45
Choi and Triantis’s inquiry seeks to propose a more nuanced answer to the
relationship between prevailing market interest rates and prevailing levels of
collateral than the practitioner intuition that the relationship is dictated by
swings in bargaining power between lenders and borrowers – it’s the market
stupid! In my own work, I have touched on the extent to which different
approaches to valuation in financial distress ex post influence capital structure
ex ante, finding important differences in the capital structures of leveraged
bond deals in the UK and the US during the course of work on the high yield
bond market.46 Happily, this was an incidental discovery and, although I
wondered in passing whether the comparatively less favourable conditions for
junior bondholders in the UK legal regime than in Chapter 11 in the US had
had a causal effect, I did not make much of it. This was all to the good because
the prevailing view since then seems to be that the availability of (cheaper) all
senior deals in the UK at the time was a function of market conditions and not
the detail of insolvency or restructuring law.47 Put shortly, the point is that it is
difficult to unpick the legal effects from other effects, such as selecting between
borrowers, types of financing (a refinancing of an existing debt structure or an
M&A structure), or the liquidity cycle. More recently AFME produced a
report considering the potential gains from reform of insolvency law.48 A
detailed economic annex prepared by Frontier Economics does seek to de-
monstrate a relationship between bond pricing and the robustness of insol-
vency law. But it also notes that:
The focus of the estimation is on ‘vanilla’ bonds, i.e. non-callable, zero-coupon
bonds issued in home currency. Other types of bond are not analysed, as it is
difficult to model these specific features within a general model, and unless
these features are captured properly, their inclusion could bias the results.
45 A. Choi and G. Triantis, ‘Market Conditions and Contract Design: Variations in Debt
Contracting’ 88 New York Law Review at pp. 105–106.
46 S. Paterson, ‘The Adaptive Capacity of Markets and Convergence in Law: UK High
Yield Issuers, US Investors and Insolvency Law’ (2015) 78(3) Modern Law Review
431–460.
47 See European Leveraged Loan Chart Book – 2Q2016 FitchRatings July 2016, at pp. 19–
20 and Leveraged Finance: Borrower-Friendly Credit Conditions Endure as the Eur-
opean Leveraged Finance Market Shrugs off Brexit Uncertainty 8 August 2016 S&P
Global Ratings.
48 AFME Potential Gains from Reforming Insolvency Law in Europe February 2016.
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Thus we see once again the challenges with building a general model which is
also comprehensive. Indeed, admittedly largely anecdotal evidence has sug-
gested that, given the widely diverging approaches to corporate insolvency
law’s normative concerns which we see across Europe, we might expect to see
greater divergence in the bond spreads of some countries from others than is
actually the case.
The normative concern
There has been lively debate about the extent to which British economic
growth has been held back by the lack of long-term financing at appropriate
rates ever since the turn of the twentieth century.49 The authorities have
pointed to an apparent lack of regard by British banks for the needs of British
industry, whilst British banks have repeatedly argued that lending to many
businesses is simply not profitable.50 After the so-called ‘Big Bang’ opened up
competition in the City of London, and lenders began to compete on price
across each other’s spheres of influence, a new model of lending opened up
(popularly known as ‘distribution banking’). Instead of focusing on returns
from lending, banks and other alternative lenders began to focus on transac-
tions and transaction fees. This necessitated the reduction of transaction costs
by restricting monitoring, improving tradability, encouraging diversification
and developing hedging techniques to reduce risk on default. Above all,
lenders began to focus on the role of leverage in improving returns.
For a good while it appeared as if this period of intense financial innovation
had solved the uncompetitive problems of the past and would provide see-
mingly limitless liquidity for British business without risking financial stabi-
lity. However, the real day of reckoning came when, notwithstanding their
apparent depth, global reach and diversification, the short term funding mar-
kets (notably the interbank market and the commercial paper market) seized
up completely once serious concerns about the quality of the assets which had
been financed took hold.51 Once this happened one of the principal things
which provided investors with confidence, market liquidity, disappeared in-
creasing concerns about default.52 This was particularly acute because some
49 R.C. Michie, The City of London: Continuity and Change, 1850–1990 (Hampshire:
Macmillan 1992), particularly the summary, at pp. 3–11.
50 D. Kynaston, The City of London: Volume III Illusions of Gold (Chatto & Windus,
London 1999), at p. 7.
51 H. Davies Can Financial Markets Be Controlled? (Cambridge, England and Malden,
USA: Polity Press, 2015), at pp. 1–2.
52 A. McNallyDebtonator (London: Elliot and Thompson, 2015), at p. 48.
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investors invested in the first place not on the basis of a proper investment
appraisal, but rather because they were confident that a liquid market would
always exist which would enable them to sell their investment.53 As Greenspan
reflects, ‘The institutions were led astray by the mistaken belief that the tight
bid-ask spreads in financial markets at the top of the boom were an indication
of the persistent availability of liquidity.’54 Some came to believe that there had
been a structural shift in financial markets which assured them of permanently
liquid markets. But even when most had been disabused of this market view,
there was still the difficulty of ‘calling’ the moment of retrenchment. It is
notoriously difficult to identify what will trigger loss of confidence in markets,
and financial firms who call a downturn too early, and do not continue to
invest in markets which (perhaps against the odds) continue to rise, are as
vilified as those who call the downturn too late. This led to Chuck Prince’s
now infamous comment’, “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things
will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up
and dance. We’re still dancing.” The comment seemed cavalier when the music
stopped, and it cost Prince his job. But it reflected the reality of a highly
competitive market in which a financial institution could no more be outdone
by a braver competitor than by a more prescient one. Thus many felt they had
no choice, even when the lie had been given to the myth of permanent
liquidity, than to continue to invest aware that they may not be able to
“anticipate the crisis in time to retrench,”55 but in the hope that a diversified
portfolio would enable them to manage the downturn when it came.
Yet when it came a familiar pattern arose: banks and other financial institutions
unable to fund themselves in the short term market were forced to liquidate
assets which rapidly achieved fire sale prices (or were not saleable at any price)
and to call in loans from other institutions, depositors became concerned about
the safety of institutions and runs on deposits follow.56 Major investment
banks had sailed “into the financial storm with financing that depended on a
level of liquidity that was about to vanish.”57 A classic liquidity and capital
crisis rapidly developed.Whilst the derivatives markets should have gone some
way to maintaining confidence that protection was in place if the underlying
53 What Keynes called a “liquidity fetish”; see A. McNally (n 52), at pp. 47–48. For a
general discussion of the role of influences on behaviour other than credit assessment see
J Black, ‘Reconceiving Financial Markets – From the Economic to the Social’ 13(2)
(2013) JCLS 406–407.
54 Greenspan, TheMap and the Territory (n 27) at p. 39.
55 Ibid., at p. 71.
56 CM Reinhart and KS Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011), at p. 144.
57 Greenspan, TheMap and the Territory (n 27), at p. 103.
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assets defaulted, derivatives turned out to be far from a panacea and actually
exacerbated some aspects of the liquidity crisis as collateral securing open
positions fell in value, and as it transpired that banks had funded many players
through the derivatives market without requiring the posting of sufficient
margin, in each case leading to swinging margin calls.58 In short, the hedging
which the derivatives provided for a defaulting book was more limited than it
had appeared in stable markets, and it became clear that this had led many
financial institutions to miscalculate the overall risk of their book.59
In another recent paper,60 I have pointed to a growing body of literature which
explores the role which our reliance on debt played in contributing to the
crisis.61 The changing political landscape in Britain (notably the decline of a
clearly identified working class loyal to a labour government in all states of the
world) reduced the credibility of redistributive policies. Thus successive gov-
ernments sought to build London as a financial centre for the world as a
solution for the long-run decline of productivity in the British commercial
sector, and facilitated borrowing as a method of equalising standards amongst
the population. Yet as a result the only visible benefit of the boom years for
that part of the population which is seriously economically and culturally left
behind has been a mountain of debt, and it is these people who have borne the
brunt of the downturn. The trickle-down theory does not seem to have come
to pass, but instead the rich have simply got richer. In a pre-crisis world,
McClosky took issue with the idea of ‘necessary excess’; that what ‘a rich
woman cannot consume, such as the diamond bauble that sits unworn at the
back of her jewelry box’ is not socially wasted because it put people to work.62
Not so she says; it is not economic prudence to keep us all at work by
‘spending on luxuries and working, working, working.’63 So the financial crisis
has left us with big questions. How can we ensure that the benefits of economic
growth are shared more widely, in an age where straightforward redistributive
58 Davies (n 51), at p. 40; Katharina Pistor, ‘Toward a Legal Theory of Finance: Retheoriz-
ing Law & Finance’ (2012) Available at: http://works.bepress.com/katharina_pistor/17,
at pp. 14–15 and 29.
59 D Awrey, ‘Toward a Supply-Side Theory of Financial Innovation’ (2013) 41(2) Journal
of Comparative Economics.
60 S. Paterson, ‘Collaborating in a Meritocracy and Post-crisis Reform’ available at: http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2801024.
61 See, for example, T. PikettyCapital in the Twenty-first Century (Cambridge, Massachu-
setts and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2014);
J Kay, Other People’s Money (Profile Books 2015); A Mian and A Sufi, House of Debt:
How They (and You) Caused the Great Recession, and HowWe Can Stop It Happening
Again (Chicago und London: University of Chicago Press, 2015).
62 McClosky (n 4), at pp. 457–458.
63 Ibid., at p. 460.
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policies attract little consensus and without dampening the entrepreneurial
spirit? How do we fund the education necessary for a greater proportion of
society to find meaningful work in our new economy?How do we provide the
returns necessary to fund an ageing population in a low growth environ-
ment?64 Is our economy too dependent on the financial sector? How do we
address the productivity puzzle, if we are to try to drive economic growth as a
solution? What sorts of employment opportunities are there for those left
behind by the knowledge economy? How do we embed non-market norms as
a disciplining force in modern markets?65
I would argue that one of the most profound lessons of the financial crisis was
that leverage throughout the system is not the answer to these big questions.
Or to put it the other way around, debt matters. Here lies the rub. I fear that if
we promote minimising cost of capital to the first normative concern of capital
markets union (and corporate law more generally), we will come inevitably to
focus on lowering the cost of finance, and cheap debt is a significant factor
which got us here in the first place. It is of course crucial that the commercial
sector has access to keenly priced capital in order to flourish. But not everyone
will flourish, and we know that capital structure choices are intrinsically
related to the risk of failure.66 So it is essential that we promote the right sorts
of capital structure decisions. Thus, at the moment, we puzzle over whether to
regulate the rise of so-called covenant lite loans (which do not have the usual
package of financial ratios such as EBITDA: Net Debt which allow the lenders
to monitor the borrower’s financial health and to bring it to the negotiating
table if its financial health worsens), or the reemergence of collateralised loan
obligations after the crisis, notwithstanding the significant role which they
played within it, or the growing ‘shadow banking system’ (largely unregulated
alternative lenders who are filling the gap left by the retreating traditional
banks after Basel III but whose links to the traditional banking sector are
obscure).
64 F. Fukyama, Political Order and Political Decay (Produce Books 2015), at p.443 ‘But
many biomedical technologies have succeeded in extending life spans at the expense of
quality of life and sharply increased dependency on caregivers. In all developed coun-
tries, the costs of end-of-life care have accelerated faster than the overall rate of econom-
ic growth, and they are on their way to becoming the single largest component of
government spending.’
65 M. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: the Moral Limits of Markets (London: Penguin
2013).
66 J.R. Graham and M.T. Leary, ‘A Review of Empirical Capital Structure Research and
Directions for the Future’, (2011) Vol 3 Annual Review of Financial Economics,
particularly at p. 9.
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If we wanted an example of how law can influence decision-making on finan-
cing choices, the financial crisis also provides specific examples. A growing
volume of literature in the US has pointed to the way in which the so-called
bankruptcy safe harbours contributed to the growth of the derivatives market
and repo market.67 Whether that is a good thing or a bad thing is highly
contested,68 and may depend on whether derivatives and repos are used to
reduce risk in the system or may actually contribute to it. But the important
thing for the present debate is that the decision to derogate from ordinary
bankruptcy rules definitely facilitated their growth. So law does matter, and we
must be clear about all of the consequences of our normative concerns.
At the same time, serious debate is emerging over the role of monetary policy
in containing credit growth precisely because of the depth and length of the
slump after the economic crisis, and the indisputable evidence of the problems
with simply “mopping up” after the credit bubble has burst. Whilst many
continue to subscribe to the view that monetary policy is not effective to
deflate bubbles,69 there is a growing view that the effects of financial crises
caused by credit booms are so severe and damaging in the long term that we
should consider using monetary policy to “lean against the wind” and counter-
act excessive credit growth.70 These are highly complex and contested ques-
tions and they require detailed and specific policy review and responses. But
they show a much greater appreciation after the financial crisis of the implica-
tions of excessive credit growth before it, and suggest that we should pause
before we promote minimising the cost of capital as the primary objective of
corporate law in general and capital markets union in particular without at
least coupling that concern with the implications of policy choices for choice
of capital structure. Thus ultimately my concern with minimising the cost of
capital as the crown prince of normative concerns is that it is a rather blunt
instrument if used as a tool of policy. In these interesting times I would suggest
that we need to be alive to all the competing visions of corporate law and to
weave our way through them, however challenging and messy that might
sound.
67 See, for example, M.J. Roe and F. Tang, ‘Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-
Seeking Upends the Creditors’ Bargain’ (2013) 99 Va. L. Rev. 1235.
68 For the English literature see P. Paech, ‘The Value of Financial Market Insolvency Safe
Harbours’ (2016) 36(4) Oxford J of Legal Studies 855 and R.Mokal, ‘Liquidity, Systemic
Risk, and the Bankruptcy Treatment of Financial Contracts’ (2016) 10 Brooklyn Journal
of Corporate, Financial andCommercial Law.
69 Greenspan, TheMap and the Territory (n 27), at p. 66.
70 F. Gourio, A.K. Kashyap and J. Sim, ‘The Tradeoffs in Leaning Against the Wind’
available at: faculty.chicagobooth.edu/anil.kashyap/research/papers/Tradeoffs_in_Lear-
ning_Aganot_one_wind_2016.pdf.
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Conclusion
Ultimately, there is both a great deal and nothing at all between Dr Steffek’s
analysis and mine. I am all too ready to agree that reducing the cost of capital is
a normative concern for corporate law generally, and CMU specifically. But I
am not prepared to elevate it to the central organising normative concern. I
base this conclusion on four things. First, in a manner somewhat after the
ethicists in the Western tradition, given that right thinking adults can readily
imagine different normative concerns for corporate law, some of which they
may wish to see fulfilled at the same time, some of which they may wish to see
accorded different weights in different circumstances, and all of which conflict,
I am sceptical about the project of identifying a dominant normative concern
for the whole of corporate law. I am bolstered in my scepticism by a strongly
held belief that normative concerns are local both in geography (jurisdiction)
and time (different ages of corporate law).
Secondly, I have a number of reservations about the possibilty of calculating
the cost of capital and bringing it into account in some sort of cost/benefit
analysis. My reservations stem in part from the breadth of Dr Steffek’s concept
of cost of capital which is at once necessary (so that everything which should
be brought into account is included in the calculation) and at the same time
undermines his thesis (because it makes the task of calculation impossible). It
also stems in part from doubt as to the validity of the neoliberal economic idea
of facilitating the (re)allocation of resources to highest and best use as a
panacea; in part by the need to (yet relative impossibility of) extend the
calculation beyond the specific firm; in part by the implications of focusing on
the flow of capital across borders as well as within borders; and in part by the
political need, on occasion, to mediate the effects of the free market without
entirely abandoning a free market ideology.
Third, Dr Steffek’s qualification that the cost of capital is inter alia determined
by the costs of company law and corporate insolvency law is a linguistically
minor but practically highly significant caveat, and I am more doubtful about
the depth of the relationship between cost of capital and law than he is. And
finally, I wonder whether a superior normative concern for the cost of capital
seems rather out-of-date in light of the lessons of the financial crisis. Thus Dr
Steffek and I can readily agree on ‘a’; we remain divided only by ‘the’.
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